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FIVE APPROACHES TO INSURING CYBER RISKS
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH*
Cyber risks are some of the most dangerous risks of the twenty-first
century. Many types of businesses, including retail stores, healthcare
entities, and financial institutions, as well as government entities, are the
targets of cyber attacks. The simple reality is that no computer security
system is completely safe. They all can be breached if the hackers are skilled
enough and determined. Consequently, the worldwide damages caused by
cyber attacks are predicted to reach $10.5 trillion by 2025. Insuring such
risks is a monumental task.
The cyber insurance market currently is fragmented with hundreds of
insurers selling their own cyber risk insurance policies that cover different
types of cyber risks. This means the purchasers of cyber insurance must be
experts in both insurance and cyber security in order to make a
knowledgeable purchase. And, even knowledgeable purchasers of cyber
insurance can only obtain limited coverage for cyber risks. This is because
the insurance is sold on a named peril, as opposed to all-risk, basis and the
policies contain numerous exclusions. Cyber policies also have relatively
low policy limits in comparison to other lines of insurance and the enormity
of the risks presented.
This Article explores ways the cyber insurance market could be
improved. In doing so, it analyzes the current cyber insurance market,
including the history of cyber insurance and the challenges that insuring
cyber risks present. The Article then offers five different approaches to
insuring cyber risks moving forward that address many of the problems with
the current cyber insurance market. Ultimately, the Article concludes the
fifth approach, the novel “All-Risk Private-Public” approach, would be the
best one.
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INTRODUCTION
Cyber risks have taken their place with climate change and natural
catastrophes as some of the most dangerous risks of this century. The former
FBI Director Robert Mueller has described the state of IT security as follows:
“[T]here are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and
those that will be. And even they are converging into one category:
companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again.”1 In short, no IT
security system is completely safe. They all can be breached if the hackers
are skilled and determined enough. Many types of businesses, including

1. Robert Mueller, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the RSA Cyber Security
Conference
(Mar.
1,
2012),
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/robertmuellerrsacyberconference2012.htm.
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retail stores, healthcare entities, and financial institutions, as well as
government entities, are the targets of cyber attacks.2
Cyber attacks can take many forms. A few of the most common ones
are: denials of service, ransomware, phishing scams, and computer hacks in
which a third party gains unauthorized access to a computer system.3 New
types and means of cyber attacks are constantly emerging.
There are many potential negative consequences of a cyber attack.
Intellectual property may be stolen. Customers’ credit card information or
social security numbers may be stolen. A company’s computer system or
website may be paralyzed, resulting in lost business. The reputations of the
hacked companies are also often tarnished due to the public’s loss of trust in
the companies’ security systems.4
The economic damage caused by cyber attacks is almost unfathomable.
By 2025, the worldwide damage caused by cyber attacks is predicted to reach
$10.5 trillion.5 In the past few years, the annual damages associated with just
ransomware claims have increased from $325 million to billions, with a
projected amount of $20 billion in 2021.6
The number of impacted entities and the list of companies compromised
by cyber attacks in recent years is incredible. In late 2016, for example, Uber
Technologies suffered a system breach that resulted in hackers obtaining
personal information for 57 million customers.7 In 2017, the NotPetya
malware caused more than $10 billion in estimated damages.8 Also in 2017,

2. See, e.g., Margaret A. Reetz, Lauren B. Prunty, Gregory S. Mantych & David J. Hommel,
Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging Coverages, and Ensuing Case Law, 122 PENN ST. L.
REV. 727, 732 (2018); Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Techno-Neutrality Solution to
Navigating Insurance Coverage for Cyber Losses, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 645, 649 (2018).
3. See generally Reetz et al., supra note 2, at 732–35.
4. See id.; Toni Scott Reed, Cybercrime and Technology Losses: Claims and Potential
Insurance Coverage for Modern Cyber Risks, 54 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 153, 164 (2019)
(“Target recorded a fourth-quarter profit down forty-six percent from the previous year and reported
a significant decline in traffic and sales after the breach became public.”).
5. See Steve Morgan, Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion Annually By 2025,
CYBERSECURITY VENTURES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypsecybercrime-report-2016/.
6. See Steve Morgan, Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted to Hit $11.5 Billion by
2019,
CYBERSECURITY
VENTURES
(Nov.
14,
2017),
https://cybersecurityventures.com/ransomware-damage-report-2017-part-2/; Ivana Vojinovic,
Ransomware Statistics in 2020: From Random Barrages to Targeted Hits, DATAPROT (Nov. 13,
2019), https://dataprot.net/statistics/ransomware-statistics/.
7. See Kate Conger, Uber Settles Data Breach Investigation for $148 Million, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/uber-data-breach.html.
8. See Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devasting Cyberattack in
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukrainerussia-code-crashed-the-world/; Selena Larson, The Hacks that Left Us Exposed in 2017, CNN
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the WannaCry malware crashed over 300,000 computer systems across 150
countries.9 Equifax was also hacked in 2017, which compromised the data,
including social security numbers, of 145 million people.10 In late 2018,
Marriott International, the world’s largest hotel company, reported a data
breach that affected 383 million guests.11 With the constant stream of reports
of new cyber attacks, the once widely discussed Target12 and Sony13 breaches
that occurred just a few years ago are fading from memory. Reportedly, only
a fraction of Sony’s and Target’s losses were covered by insurance.14
Much of the existing cyber insurance scholarship explores ways for
cyber insurers to serve as private regulators of cyber security practices by
creating premium incentives for certain system security practices and using
insurers’ third-party system security experts to provide security advice to
insured businesses.15 Insurers generally can have non-governmental,
regulatory effects on policyholder behavior by, for example, providing
premium incentives for risk-reducing behavior, so discussing insurance’s
potential role in that regard is certainly valuable.16 Such scholarship does
not, however, address the fundamental question facing the cyber insurance

MONEY (Dec. 20, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/biggestcyberattacks-of-the-year/index.html.
9. See Larson, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. See Peter Holley, Marriott: Hackers Accessed More Than 5 Million Passport Numbers
During November’s Massive Data Breach, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/04/marriott-hackers-accessed-more-thanmillion-passport-numbers-during-novembers-massive-data-breach/.
12. See Reuters, Target Settles 2013 Hacked Customer Data Breach for $18.5 Million, NBC
NEWS (May 24, 2017, 10:49 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/targetsettles-2013-hacked-customer-data-breach-18-5-million-n764031
(stating
Target
had
approximately $202 million in damages).
13. See Steve Kroft, The Attack on Sony, CBS NEWS (Apr. 12, 2015),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korean-cyberattack-on-sony-60-minutes/ (“More than 3,000
computers and 800 servers were destroyed by the attackers after they had made off with mountains
of business secrets, several unreleased movies, unfinished scripts, and the personal records of 6,000
employees . . . .”).
14. See 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 29.01[2][a][ii] (2020).
15. See, e.g., JOSEPHINE WOLFF, CYBER-INSURANCE POLICY: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL
RISK FOR THE INTERNET AGE (MIT Press, forthcoming) (manuscript at 231–32) (arguing insurers
should serve as cyber security regulators to incentivize policyholders to increase system security);
Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as
“Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 417, 417 (2018) (arguing cyber
insurers already are acting as regulators of cyber security); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring
Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1534 (2017) (arguing cyber insurers are uniquely positioned to
regulate cyber security).
16. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 196, 206 (2012) (discussing the use of
insurance as a non-governmental regulator of policyholders’ behavior).
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market today, which is: What is the best approach to insuring cyber risks that
will allow insurance to effectively transfer the risk of cyber losses from
individual policyholders to entities that are financially able to bear the risk of
those losses?
This Article addresses that fundamental question. In doing so, it
discusses five different approaches to insuring cyber risks. Ultimately, the
Article proposes a novel “All-Risk Private-Public” approach to insuring
cyber risks that combines the best attributes of private cyber insurance with
public insurance by proposing that private insurers sell “all-risk”17 cyber
policies with the federal government serving as an excess insurer or reinsurer
above a stop-loss amount like it currently does for terrorism risks under the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (“TRIA”).18
The proposed “All-Risk Private-Public” approach would address the
numerous challenges of insuring cyber risks. One of those challenges is that
cyber risks are different from other risks in one significant way: Cyber attacks
can come from anywhere in the world, at any time, and can impact thousands
of businesses at approximately the same time, making cyber losses correlated
risks.19 If someone wants to steal the blueprints for an invention from a
company’s safe, for example, then a person has to show up where the safe is
located in order to steal the blueprints. With a cyber attack, a hacker sitting
in front of a computer in Latvia at 2:00 AM can break into the business’s
computer system in the United States and steal a copy of the blueprints.
Another challenge is that the legal obligations regarding cyber attacks
for insured entities are ever-changing and increasing, so attempting to insure
such obligations is akin to shooting a moving target. For example, although
not required two decades ago, a hacked company now must notify the people
potentially affected by a cyber attack, disclose the attack on its financial

17. “All risk” property insurance covers all risks of loss except for perils specifically excluded.
See PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, POLICY HOLDER’S GUIDE TO
THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 13.02[B] (2009).
18. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.) (TRIA is used in this Article to refer
to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program collectively); see
infra Section III.D.
19. Correlated risks are perils that cause numerous losses to the pool of insureds at
approximately the same time.
See Correlated Risks, WORLD FIN. (June 30, 2010),
http://www.worldfinance.com/home/risk-encyclopaedia/correlated-risks [https://perma.cc/CQ3D865A]; Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe:
Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENV’T & POL’Y
F. 185, 187 (2012); J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for
Catastrophes?, 2006 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 342–43 (2006); Adam F. Scales, A
Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. COLL. L.
REV. 3, 10–11 (2006).
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statements, defend claims asserted against it related to the company’s failure
to protect others’ personal data, and respond to government investigations.20
Yet an additional challenge for insuring cyber risks is determining how
to accurately price cyber insurance to make sure it is being sold at actuarially
sound prices. Accurate claims data is the foundation of actuarially sound
premium pricing but only a paltry amount of data exists for cyber risks and
losses.21 So, when attempting to price cyber insurance, insurers must do so
without the benefit of the decades’ worth of claims data that exists for other
lines of insurance.22
Not only do they lack their own claims data, but insurers generally
cannot even rely upon the claims data being generated by other insurers
because, in the unlikely event that their competitors were willing to share
such data—which generally is considered confidential and proprietary—the
data would not be particularly useful.23 Unlike other lines of insurance, cyber
insurers have developed their own cyber policy forms instead of using a
uniform industry-developed form, so the hundreds of insurers selling cyber
insurance are not actually selling the same product.24 With numerous policy
forms using different policy language and providing different coverages, it is
like comparing apples to oranges when it comes to the claims data—one type
of cyber loss may be covered under one insurer’s policy form, but it would
not be covered under another’s. Consequently, the claims data that one
20. See, e.g., Reetz et al., supra note 2, at 733–34.
21. Insurers’ actuaries use decades’ worth of claims data related to other lines of insurance
collected by the entire insurance industry through the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”) to
create a risk profile for each prospective insured. See, e.g., JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DELAY,
DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO
ABOUT IT 14 (2010) (explaining how insurers use claims data); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection
in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1245, 1248–49, 1251–52, 1263
(2004) (discussing the sources of informational asymmetry between insurers and insureds); BenShahar & Logue, supra note 16, at 209–11 (examining insurers’ informational advantages regarding
insureds’ risks).
22. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 5 (“[I]nsurance firms lacked the decades of claims data that
informed the actuarial models for their other insurance offerings . . . .”); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at
1544 (“A key reason that it is difficult to determine an accurate measure of damages is that there is
a lack of actual data about the consumer costs of data breaches.”); Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon,
Andreas Kuehn & Therese Jones, Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do Carriers
Price Cyber Risk?, 5(1) J. CYBERSECURITY 1, 12 (2019) (“[Insurers] have no historic or credible
data upon which to make reliable inferences about loss expectations . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 21, at 38–40 (discussing how insurance companies closely
guard data on lawsuits for unfair claims practices); Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque:
Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV.
394, 415–20 (2014) (discussing the need for the disclosure of insurers’ claims payment practices in
order to allow consumers to make more informed insurance purchasing decisions).
24. See, e.g., 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[3][d] (“There is a large array of specialty cyber products on the market, with each policy
varying greatly from insurer to insurer.”).
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insurer generates is nearly useless to other insurers because the data is not
predictive of other insurers’ likely claims experience.
An additional challenge is that, unlike the policy forms used in other
lines of insurance—such as Commercial General Liability (“CGL”)
insurance, which has been sold since the 1940s and has been interpreted by
numerous courts25—the policy language contained in cyber policies
generally has not been interpreted by the courts because cyber policy forms
are relatively new and, as mentioned, the coverages they provide are not
uniform.26 Without court decisions interpreting cyber insurance policy
language, insurers do not know which cyber losses will actually be covered
by their policies regardless of the insurers’ intent with respect to the meaning
of the policy language. Collectively, all these challenges result in insurers
guessing to some extent when they establish the price of the premiums for
cyber insurance.27
In the face of these formidable challenges, the existing cyber insurance
market nonetheless is growing rapidly. In 2019, insurers collected
approximately $2.5 billion in premiums.28 Between 2015 and 2019, the
number of insurers selling cyber insurance increased from 322 to 580.29
The dramatic growth of the cyber insurance market is due, in part, to the
high profit margins associated with cyber insurance—the profit margin for
cyber policies is approximately sixty-five percent, while the average profit
margin for other lines of insurance is approximately thirty-eight percent.30
These sizeable profit margins are generated by the high premiums charged in
exchange for the relatively low amounts of coverage provided—the premium
rates are three times higher than for other lines of liability insurance and six
times higher than for other lines of property insurance.31 Thus, as currently
structured, the cyber insurance market works well for insurers by providing
them high profit margins in exchange for the provision of limited insurance.
This Article discusses ways to fulfill the needs of both insurers and
policyholders by considering the enormous challenges cyber risks present
25. See, e.g., infra Section I.B.
26. Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 651 (describing the policy language in cyber policies
as “untested”); 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[3][d] (“Because cyber policies are still relatively new, courts have only just begun to tackle
the interpretive issues raised by these policies.”).
27. See, e.g., Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 12 (some insurers basically “estimated or
guessed” in establishing premium prices).
28. See FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY 68 (Sept. 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/311/2020-FIO-AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter FIO ANNUAL REPORT].
29. Id. at 69.
30. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 229.
31. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1537.
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from a risk management perspective. In doing so, it proceeds in three parts.
Part I discusses the history of cyber insurance.32 Part II discusses the
challenges associated with insuring cyber risks.33 Part III provides five
approaches the cyber insurance market could take moving forward: (1)
maintain the status quo and let the market dictate the best approach to
insuring cyber risks; (2) have traditional CGL policies and “all risk” property
policies cover cyber risks; (3) sell cyber insurance as standalone insurance
but use separate, uniform policy forms for third-party liability risks and firstparty risks; (4) have the federal government serve as a stop-loss excess
insurer or reinsurer for cyber risks by using the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program (“TRIA”) as a template for structuring the program; and (5) sell
cyber insurance as standalone insurance using separate, uniform policy forms
for third-party risks and first-party risks, with the federal government
providing excess insurance or reinsurance above established stop-loss
points.34 The Article concludes by arguing that the fifth approach, the novel
All-Risk Private-Public approach, is the best one.35
I. THE CYBER INSURANCE MARKET
A. The Creation and History of Cyber Insurance
The first insurance policies that would be considered cyber insurance
today were created in the mid-1990s by an insurance broker, Steven Haase,
because his clients—the first online bank and a network security company—
were doing a substantial amount of business on the Internet.36 As the Internet
became commercialized, Haase saw the need for a liability policy for
companies doing business on the Internet.37 So, Haase worked with
American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) to develop a cyber risk policy,
the Internet Security Liability Policy, which AIG began selling it in 1997.38
Early cyber policies often used Errors and Omissions (“E&O”) policy
forms for financial institutions as templates, and only provided coverage for
third-party liabilities.39 First-party coverage for a policyholder’s own losses
32. See infra Part I.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Conclusion.
36. See Andrea Wells, What Agent Who Wrote First Cyber Policy Thinks About Cyber
Insurance
Now,
INS.
J.
(Mar.
1,
2018),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/03/01/481886.htm.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Reetz et al., supra note 2, at 731; Mark Camillo, Cyber Risk and the Changing Role of
Insurance, 2 J. CYBER POL’Y 53, 53 (2017) (“Cyber insurance as a stand-alone product began to
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caused by cyber attacks was not covered by the initial cyber policies.40 Nor
was coverage provided for cyber losses caused by a policyholder’s own
employees.41 When studies revealed that approximately fifty percent of
cyber hacks were caused by disgruntled employees, cyber coverage was
expanded to cover employee-caused losses as well.42
The addition of coverage for losses caused by disgruntled employees is
exemplary of how cyber insurance has evolved since its initial creation. Over
time, cyber insurance has evolved to cover new cyber risks as they have
emerged, and to cover new liabilities for data breaches as the laws in the area
have developed.43 For example, after significant network extortion events
occurred in 2004, cyber coverage was expanded to cover such events.44 After
customer breach notification laws were created, with California being the
first state to do so in 2003, cyber policies began covering the costs associated
with complying with such laws.45
One of the challenges in the area of cyber security is that there is neither
a general set of federal data security laws that apply to all businesses nor
established standards for the best cyber security practices.46 Instead, there is
a patchwork quilt of data security laws that apply to specific industries to
address specific concerns and a variety of sources that disagree on the best
cyber security practices. For example, there are specific laws that apply to

take off in response to Y2K concerns and was designed to fill gaps in traditional property and
casualty (P&C) products. The number of insurance providers offering the product gradually
expanded, although it remained a niche speciali[z]ed market during these early days.” (footnote
omitted)); Brian D. Brown, The Ever-Evolving Nature of Cyber Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-eatures/2014/09/22/340633.htm
(“[T]he
original policies covered only third party suits arising from breaches originating from outside the
company. . . . The markets offering coverage at that time responded by broadening coverage to
cover loss to the entity . . . .”).
40. Reetz et al., supra note 2, at 730–31.
41. See Brown, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 15, at 120–21.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Camillo, supra note 39, at 54. Today, all fifty states have customer breach notification
laws. See, e.g., 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[1]; Reed, supra note 4, at 162. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) now
also requires companies to disclose major hacking incidents. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 4, at 164;
WOLFF, supra note 15, at 12.
46. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1516 (“In the United States there is no general law of
data security. Rather, there is a sector-by-sector approach to regulating specific security
concerns.”); WOLFF, supra note 15, at 13 (“[T]he federal government remained relatively hands-off
when it came to mandating security best practices or clarifying the expectations for what companies
must do to avoid liability for cybersecurity incidents.”).
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the security of personal financial data,47 personal health data,48 and consumer
credit data,49 but there are no general cyber security laws. Without a
comprehensive set of cyber security requirements or standards, it is difficult
for insurers and policyholders to know whether a policyholder is employing
the best cyber security measures or taking the appropriate steps to comply
with data security laws.
While the coverages under cyber policies have evolved to cover new
cyber liabilities and risks as they have emerged, the insurance industry
simultaneously has attempted to eliminate coverage for cyber risks under
traditional liability and property policies, such as CGL policies and
commercial all-risk property policies.50 For example, over the past two
decades, the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”)51 has repeatedly revised
its CGL policy form to eliminate coverage for “electronic data” losses.52 In
2001, ISO changed the definition of what constituted covered “property
damage” under CGL policies to make it clear that lost electronic data is not
covered because:
[E]lectronic data is not tangible property. . . . [E]lectronic data
means information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or
used on, or transmitted to or from computer software, including
systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks,
CDROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data processing devices or any
other media which are used with electronically controlled
equipment.53
In 2004, ISO added an exclusion in CGL policies for “[d]amages arising out
of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or
inability to manipulate electronic data.”54

47. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (applying to the financial services industry).
48. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (applying to patients’ health information).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (setting forth the protections of consumers’ rights to privacy
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
50. See infra Section I.B.
51. ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that provides a variety of
services to many insurers. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla.
2007). One of ISO’s primary functions is to draft policy forms that are then submitted to state
insurance regulators for approval. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772
(1993). As a provider of services to approximately 1,400 property and casualty insurers, ISO “is
the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance.” Id. As a result,
“most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id.
52. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 4, at 174.
53. Id. (quoting ISO form CG 00 01 10 01).
54. ISO Policy Form CG 00 01 12 04, Exclusion P.
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ISO has also added other exclusions to its CGL policy form that were
designed to eliminate coverage for the various types of cyber losses as they
have emerged. For example, in 2014, ISO added an exclusion for liabilities
due to the disclosure of confidential or personal information:
This insurance does not apply to:
...
“Personal and advertising injury” arising out of any access to or
disclosure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or
personal information, including patents, trade secrets, processing
methods, customer lists, financial information, credit card
information, health information or any other type of non public
[sic] information.
This exclusion applies even if damages are claimed for notification
costs, credit monitoring expenses, forensic expenses, public
relations expenses or any other loss, cost or expense incurred by
you or others arising out of any access to or disclosure of any
person’s or organization’s confidential or personal information.55
ISO similarly has attempted to eliminate coverage for cyber losses under
its commercial all-risk property policy form.56 For example, since 2012, the
ISO policy form has expressly disclaimed coverage for lost electronic data.
Notably, the form states:
Covered Property does not include:
...
Electronic data . . . . Electronic data means information, facts or
computer programs stored as or on, created or used on, or
transmitted to or from computer software (including systems and
applications software), on hard or floppy disks, CD-ROMs, tapes,
drives, cells, data processing devices or any other repositories of
computer software which are used with electronically controlled
equipment.57
Similarly, with respect to business interruption losses caused by cyber
attacks (e.g., the lost revenues a company suffers because the company’s
website becomes paralyzed by a cyber attack), ISO’s all-risk property policy
form seeks to disclaim coverage for such losses, stating, “[c]overage for
Business Income does not apply when a ‘suspension’ of ‘operations’ is

55. Reed, supra note 4, at 175–76; ISO Policy Form CG 21 07 05 14 (2014).
56. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 15, at 125 (“[I]n 2003, the insurance industry developed the
Institute Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause . . . [which] became popular with property insurers,
enabling them to deny coverage for malicious cybersecurity incidents.”).
57. ISO
Policy
Form
CP
00
10
10
12,
§ A.2.n,
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/2017/05/CP00101012.pdf.

114

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:103

caused by destruction or corruption of electronic data, or any loss or damage
to electronic data . . . .”58
In sum, insurers have increased the number and scope of the exclusions
directed at cyber risks under traditional liability and property policies while
they created and expanded the coverage provided under cyber policies.
Doing so, of course, has allowed insurers to now sell an additional policy to
cover losses that arguably would have been covered under either a CGL
policy or an all-risk property policy before the data loss and other exclusions
were added to them.
B. The Current Cyber Insurance Market
Today, cyber insurance is sold as either a standalone policy or as an addon coverage to CGL and property policies.59 There are now at least 580
insurers selling cyber insurance, but the top ten insurers account for
approximately 64% of the market.60 Between 2015 and 2018, premium sales
for cyber insurance increased by 479%.61 In 2019, insurers collected
approximately $2.5 billion in cyber insurance premiums.62 The worldwide
cyber insurance market today is largely limited to sales in the United States,
with the U.S. market accounting for 90% of cyber insurance sales and Europe
accounting for between 5–9%.63
Cyber policies today typically provide both first-party and third-party
coverage.64 Coverage is provided on a “named peril” basis, as opposed to
“all-risk,”65 with the various coverages often sold à la carte. Under named

58. ISO
Policy
Form
CP
00
30
06
07,
§ A.4.a,
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/wp-includes/msfiles.php?file=file/CP%2000%2030%2006%2007.pdf.
59. See 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[4][g]; Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 650; Reed, supra note 4, at 170; WOLFF, supra
note 15, at 4.
60. See FIO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28.
61. WOLFF, supra note 15, at 155.
62. FIO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 68.
63. See id. at 203.
64. See, e.g., Reetz et al., supra note 2, at 738; WOLFF, supra note 15, at 157 (“The most
commonly covered cyber-related losses . . . include[] the cost of legal claims, settlement costs,
public relations services, notifying affected individuals about data breaches, computer forensic
investigations, business income losses, data restoration, and data extortion expenses.”).
65. Under all-risk policies, all risks are covered unless a risk is specifically excluded. See 3
NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.06[2][d] (2020) (explaining the
differences between “all risk” and “named perils” coverage); COUCH ON INSURANCE § 148:50 (3d
ed. 2020) (discussing the increasing use of “all risk” policies and explaining that such policies cover
all risks unless a risk is specifically excluded).
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peril insurance, only the risks specifically listed are covered.66 Available
first-party coverages include: forensic investigation costs to discover the
cause of a breach, costs to restore service and restore lost data, the costs of
losses due to cybercrimes (e.g., ransomware, phishing, and denial of service
attacks), and the replacement of lost revenue due to business interruptions.67
Available third-party liability coverages include: costs to comply with breach
notification laws, fines for failure to comply with breach notification laws,
credit monitoring costs for affected customers, reimbursement costs paid to
financial institutions for fraudulent purchases, and the costs to compensate
third parties for stolen electronic data or intellectual property.68
Some scholars, such as Professor Josephine Wolff, have argued that,
although some cyber policies currently provide such coverage, cyber
insurance should not cover losses associated with certain cybercrimes (e.g.,
ransomware losses) because providing such coverage only encourages and
rewards criminal behavior, such as kidnapping.69 Yet, insurance already is
available and allowed to pay ransoms for kidnappings.70 Allowing cyber

66. See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, POLICYHOLDER’S
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 13.02[A] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2020).
67. See Reed, supra note 4, at 165 (“First-party risks include the cost of replacing data that are
lost through corruption of the system, loss of stolen property, the cost of replacing systems that
become inoperable, and the labor expenses from reentering data. . . . Finally, there may be risks of
loss of the insured’s money, as well as lost income, consequential damages, and crisis management
costs.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION,
supra note 14, at § 29.01[2][a][ii] n.48; Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 5.
68. See Reed, supra note 4, at 166 (“Third-party losses are losses that result when cybercrime
damages or destroys data or steals information of a third party that is in the care, custody, or control
of the victim of the breach, that is, the insured. These losses are typically sustained from the
following general cybercrimes: intrusion into computer systems to steal bank account numbers,
transmission of a computer virus through the insured’s computer system into the system of a third
party . . . and failure to give notice to a third party of the intrusion in violation of statute, regulation,
or contract.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 4 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION,
supra note 14, at § 29.01[2][b]; Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 6–7.
69. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 225–27; Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, The
Paradox of Insurance, PENN L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 31 (Mar. 9, 2021) (“The
bottom line is that while it’s difficult to prove that kidnap insurance increases kidnappings, the
limited available evidence is entirely consistent with that possibility, and some theoretical models
predict it.”).
70. See Amy Bell, A Guide to Kidnap and Ransom Insurance Coverage, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept.
19, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/062915/guide-kidnap-ransominsurance-coverage.asp (“Kidnap and ransom coverage is often provided as part of a corporate
insurance portfolio.”); What is Kidnap & Ransom Insurance?, TRAVELERS INS.
https://www.travelers.com/professional-liability-insurance/kidnap-ransom (last visited Sept. 28,
2021) (“Kidnap & Ransom insurance policies provide coverage typically for monies paid to
kidnappers or extortionists, loss of ransom in transit and other expenses incurred as a result of a
kidnapping.”);
Kidnap,
Ransom
&
Extortion
Insurance,
AIG,
https://www.aig.com/business/insurance/management-liability/kidnap-ransom-and-extortion (last
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insurance to cover ransomware payment demands is conceptually no
different. Indeed, society has a greater interest in discouraging kidnappings
than computer hijacks, yet insurance is permitted to cover kidnapping ransom
payments.71 Further, the concern and argument that insurance should not be
allowed to cover crimes because it incentivizes criminal behavior also applies
to many other types of property insurance, including homeowners insurance
and auto insurance, yet they too are allowed to cover a policyholder’s losses
caused by criminal behavior.72
Arguments against allowing coverage for the compensation of victims
of crime also overlook the primary purpose of insurance, which is to
compensate victims for their losses, not to indirectly regulate third parties’
criminal behavior.73 Forcing victims of crime to suffer losses at the hands of
criminals for crimes such as ransom demands may have some deterrent effect
on criminal behavior to the extent it removes a source of financial benefits
available to pay for ransomed property, but there are better ways to deter
criminal behavior. For example, one would expect that the risk of
incarceration would be a stronger deterrent to crime than the risk the victim
will not have adequate financial resources to make the crime worthwhile to
the criminal if insurance proceeds are unavailable.74 In short, the arguments
in favor of treating cybercrimes differently than other crimes when it comes
to insurance are not persuasive.

visited Sept. 28, 2021) (“Coverage for a range of crisis perils, including kidnapping, extortion,
assault (known as active shooter or workplace violence) and more.”).
71. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 226 (“[T]he stakes of ransomware are often—though not
always—lower than in cases of kidnapping, where individuals’ lives are presumably at stake.”).
72. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 196, 645 (6th ed. 2015) (reproducing ISO’s auto and homeowners insurance policy
forms that cover losses caused by, among other things, “Malicious mischief or vandalism” and
theft).
73. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003) (explaining how the concept of insurance is
predicated on the existence of a large number of fortunate insureds’ premiums paying for the losses
of the unfortunate few); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity,
6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (noting that the basic premise of insurance is collective
responsibility for harms that befall individuals); Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that
Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 65, 97 (2012) (discussing the lack of empirical evidence to support the argument that
intentional misconduct would be deterred by the lack of insurance to cover the liabilities that arise
from such misconduct); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (“The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against liability
under Title VII will encourage violations of the Act is . . . speculative and erroneous.”).
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (authorizing prison sentences of as high as twenty-five years
under Sarbanes-Oxley for misrepresentations regarding securities despite D&O insurance being
allowed to cover shareholder fraud claims).
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The issue of insuring cybercrimes raises another somewhat unusual
aspect of the current cyber insurance market—some cyber policies cover
crimes while other cyber policies do not.75 Unlike many lines of insurance,
such as CGL and auto insurance, there is no standard cyber risk policy form.76
The cyber insurance market is fragmented with hundreds of insurers selling
cyber policies using their own policy forms.77 Despite being sold for more
than twenty years, additional insurers continue to enter the cyber insurance
market using their own policy forms, with many of them providing
dramatically different coverages.78
Currently, insurers also offer only limited coverage under cyber policies
in exchange for very high premium prices.79 Insurers charge as much as
$42,000 for $1 million in coverage.80 To provide some context regarding
how expensive that is, a person can buy $1 million of coverage under an
umbrella insurance policy for auto and homeowners claims for between $150

75. Compare The Hartford CyberChoice 2.0: Information Technology Liability and Risk
Policy, § I.E., HARTFORD (2008), https://safeguardme.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/PDF3.pdf
[hereinafter The Hartford CyberChoice 2.0] (covering cyber extortion losses), with Will Cyber
Insurance Cover You After a Ransomware Attack?, CONTINUUM GRC (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://continuumgrc.com/cyber-insurance-ransomware/ (“[I]f a policy does not specifically include
‘extortion coverage,’ ransomware won’t be covered at all.”).
76. See, e.g., 1 NEW APPLEMAN PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 7.22[1]
(2020) (“Cyber insurance is not standard. There is a wide variety of specialty cyber insurance on
the market, with policies varying greatly from insurer to insurer.”); 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at § 29.04[1][b][i] (“[T]here is little uniformity
among cyber policies, and there is no such thing as a ‘standard’ cyber policy.”); Reed, supra note
4, at 174 (“An important consideration with cyber-risk policies is that the policies are not
standardized.”); ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 437–54, 638–50 (reproducing ISO’s
standard CGL and auto policy forms used by most insurers).
77. See supra notes 24, 28–29 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[3][d] (“There is a large array of specialty cyber products on the market, with each policy
varying greatly from insurer to insurer.”); Reed, supra note 4, at 174 (“The policies provide similar
coverage, but the policies can vary significantly from insurer to insurer in wording, format, and
availability or treatment of certain coverages. The lack of uniformity among these policies will
make interpretation and comparison difficult for insureds and insurers.”).
79. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 172 (“Given the threat of correlated, large-scale cyber risk
hanging over the cyber-insurance industry, it’s not surprising that policy limits are generally
relatively low and premiums and deductibles are high.”); Camillo, supra note 39, at 56 (“Of
particular concern from an aggregation perspective are the activities of state-sponsored or terrorist
attackers . . . . Major events, such as a cyberattack on the U.S. power grid . . . could trigger
catastrophic and far-reaching losses. In this hypothetical scenario, which envisages hackers shutting
down parts of the U.S. power grid . . . the total impact on the U.S. economy was estimated at $243
billion, rising to over $1 trillion in the most extreme scenario.”).
80. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 173; see also Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 2 (“Average
premiums are priced between $10,000 and $25,000 . . . .”).
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and $300.81 Consequently, because the cyber losses paid by insurers thus far
have been small compared to the premiums they have collected, cyber
insurance is very profitable for insurers—they have been receiving a profit
margin of approximately 65% for cyber insurance versus 38% for general
property insurance.82 Yet, some policyholders have been willing to pay the
high price for cyber insurance, with about one-third of all companies buying
it.83
It is somewhat understandable why insurers thus far have erred on the
side of charging premium rates much higher than for other lines of insurance.
Pricing cyber insurance involves a lot of guesswork because, unlike other
lines of insurance, such as auto and life, insurers do not have fulsome
databases regarding cyber claims.84 This is because, as previously noted,
cyber risks and cyber insurance are relatively new, and cyber risks are
constantly changing.85 It is also because many hacked companies do not
disclose when they have been hacked due to reputational concerns and the
lack of a legal obligation to report many types of cyber attacks.86

81. See, e.g., Anna Baluch, Best Umbrella Insurance Companies, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/best-umbrella-insurance-4845653 (Feb. 26, 2021) (“According to the Insurance
Information Institute, you may be able to lock in $1 million worth of umbrella coverage for
anywhere between $150 to $300 per year.”); Should I Purchase an Umbrella Liability Policy?, INS.
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/should-i-purchase-umbrella-liability-policy-0 (last visited
July 13, 2021) (“For about $150 to $300 per year you can buy a $1 million personal umbrella
liability policy. The next million will cost about $75, and $50 for every million after that.”).
82. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1537 (explaining that premium rates for cyber insurance are
three to six times higher than other types of insurance); WOLFF, supra note 15, at 229.
83. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1536; WOLFF, supra note 15, at 229.
84. See, e.g., Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 12–13 (“[Insurers] have no historic or credible
data upon which to make reliable inferences about loss expectations . . . . [I]n some cases, the
carrier would appear to guess . . . .”); Buffett Cautious on Cyber Insurance Because No One Knows
Risks, NEWSMAX FIN. (May 5, 2018, 12:14 PM), https://www.newsmax.com/finance/
streettalk/buffett-cyber-insurancerisks/2018/05/05/id/858534/ (quoting Warren Buffet of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., “I don’t think we or anybody else really knows what they’re doing when writing
cyber,” and anyone who claims to be able to accurately predict cyber losses are “kidding
themselves”); Reed, supra note 4, at 171 (“[T]here is little or no claims history and data to analyze,
and little experience to use in order to know what information to gather from the insured to
determine appropriate coverage.”); WOLFF, supra note 15, at 158 (“One of the primary challenges
insurers face is the lack of reliable, consistently collected data about the frequency and cost of
cybersecurity incidents.”).
85. See supra Introduction; note 26 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 4, at 161 (“[A]ttempts to calculate the actual cost of cybercrime
are often hindered by the fact that organizations are unlikely to be willing to share exactly how
much cybercrime has cost them for fear of reputational damage.”); Ransomware, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS (June 23, 2020), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_ransomware.htm (“[M]any
ransomware attacks go unreported.”); Camillo, supra note 39, at 59 (“The reputational impact of a
data breach or cyber intrusion is also of growing concern to risk managers . . . .”); WOLFF, supra
note 15, at 198 (explaining that cyber attacks resulting in only first party losses can “be caused by
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Consequently, there is a spectrum regarding how insurers calculate
premiums. On one end, some insurers make relatively sophisticated actuarial
projections based upon the policyholder’s industry, the size of the
policyholder in terms of annual revenues or number of employees, and the
policyholder’s answers to a system-security questionnaire.87 On the other
end, some insurers simply use flat rates for all policyholders or use the
premium rates charged by other insurers.88 Thus, for many insurers, premium
rates are not tied to the policyholder’s security measures in place.89
Regardless of the price of a cyber policy, however, the amount of risk
actually transferred to insurers under most cyber policies is somewhat limited
because insurers typically are willing to provide relatively low limits of
coverage for policies that have large deductibles and numerous exclusions.90
Some of the exclusions even appear to remove coverage for the very cyber
risks the policies purport to cover under the insuring agreement portion of the
policy.91
For example, although policyholders buy cyber insurance to protect
themselves against their failure to prevent successful cyber attacks, some
cyber policies exclude coverage for “an Insured’s failure to take steps to use,
design, maintain or upgrade a Computer System in order to prevent or avoid
a Network Security Wrongful Act”92 or the “[f]ailure to ensure that the
computer system is reasonably protected by security practices and systems
incidents that companies had no obligation to report, leaving insurers even more in the dark about
how to build accurate risk models . . . .”).
87. See Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 15–16; WOLFF, supra note 15, at 173–75.
88. See Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 13–14; WOLFF, supra note 15, at 173 (explaining
that some insurers “looked to the premiums set by their competitors to help determine their own
prices”).
89. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 172 (noting it is surprising “how little [premium rates] seem
to be influenced by the insured entity’s actual security posture”).
90. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 172 (“Given the threat of correlated, large-scale cyber risk
hanging over the cyber-insurance industry, it’s not surprising that policy limits are generally
relatively low and premiums and deductibles are high.”); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1499 (“[C]yber
insurance . . . policies are written narrowly.”); Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 663 (“Policies
providing coverage for a data breach or data loss have very narrow definitions of what type of loss
is covered.”); Camillo, supra note 39, at 62 (“Due to concerns over aggregation, many insurers are
currently reluctant to offer substantial limits for cyber terrorism, or cyberattack[s] . . . .”); 1 NEW
APPLEMAN PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 76, at § 7.22[4][a]
(“The ISO Cyber Policy contains 30 exclusions.”).
91. See, e.g., Erica J. Dominitz, To Err Is Human; To Insure, Divine: Shouldn’t Cyber
Insurance Cover Data Breach Losses Arising (in Whole or in Part) from Negligence?, BRIEF,
Summer 2017, at 32, 33 (“[A] number of cyber insurance policies contain certain exclusions that, if
interpreted broadly, could significantly limit, or eliminate altogether, coverage . . . .”); Hurwitz,
supra note 15, at 1537 (“[I]nsurers are pushing . . . for broad construction of these policies’
exclusions . . . .”); WOLFF, supra note 15, at 237 (“[T]he short history of the past cyber-insurance
market suggests . . . an expanding set of exclusions and no clear decrease in premium payments.”).
92. See The Hartford CyberChoice 2.0, supra note 75, at § IV(A)(9)(b) (emphasis omitted).
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maintenance procedures that are equal to or superior to those disclosed in the
proposal.”93 Such exclusions are particularly problematic because there are
“no clear, codified industry standard[s] for cybersecurity.”94 Consequently,
when presented with cyber loss claims, insurers may argue these exclusions
eliminate coverage for cyber losses that occur due to the policyholder’s
negligent computer security practices and systems.95 Yet, that is the very
reason policyholders purchase cyber insurance—to protect against cyber
losses caused by, among other things, negligent computer security practices
and systems. If cyber policies do not even cover cyber losses that result from
a policyholder’s negligent protection of its computer system, then the policies
arguably provide only illusory coverage for many, if not most, cyber losses.96
Similarly, although many cyber policies purport to provide coverage for
policyholders’ liabilities to financial institutions for the reimbursement of the
costs associated with fraudulent transactions resulting from a security breach
(e.g., credit card charges on a stolen credit card number), the policies often
also contain a “contractual liability” exclusion.97 A contractual liability
exclusion precludes coverage for “[a]ny contractual liability or obligation or
any breach of contract, including any liability of others assumed by you,
unless such liability would have attached to you even in the absence of such
contract.”98 Insurers have successfully argued to courts that such exclusions
apply to situations where, for example, MasterCard or Visa seek
reimbursement from the victimized policyholder for fraudulent credit card
charges as result of a successful cyber attack on the policyholder’s computer
93. PHILA. INDEM. INS. CO., CYBER SECURITY LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM § IV.D.,
https://www.phly.com/files/Cyber%20Security%20Liability%20Policy%20Form36-8835.pdf.
94. WOLFF, supra note 15, at 64.
95. See, e.g., Dominitz, supra note 91, at 33 (“By interpreting such exclusions broadly, insurers
could argue that there is no coverage for virtually any data breach event by arguing that the breach
resulted, at least in part, from system failures, negligent adoption of inadequate cybersecurity
protocols . . . .”); Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 667 (“[A] surprising number of cyberinsurance policies incorporate various pre-loss cyber-security requirements to which a policyholder
must adhere in order to obtain coverage post-loss.”).
96. See Dominitz, supra note 91, at 33–34 (“[W]hile the insurance industry commonly markets
cyber insurance products to companies as comprehensive protection from the full breadth of cyberrelated risks, in actuality, many cyber policies are written on insurance forms that insurers might
argue exclude coverage for more than 50 percent of the traditional and common data breach
scenarios . . . .”); Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 668 (criticizing policy provisions that only
allow non-negligent policyholders to recover, arguing that “the pre-loss computer security
requirements demanded by the insurer are acting as post-claim underwriting opportunities for the
insurer. . . . After the loss, if the policyholder has not met the insurer-specified behavioral
standards, that insurer can back out of coverage. This is akin to an attempt by the insurer to eliminate
substantially all risks . . . . If a policyholder had perfect compliance with computer security, the risk
of loss should be zero.”).
97. PHILA. INDEM. INS. CO., supra note 93, at § IV.P.
98. Id.
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system because the credit card companies’ contracts with the policyholder
require the policyholder to reimburse the credit card companies for losses
caused by the policyholder’s loss of its customers’ credit card numbers.99 So,
an unwary policyholder may think it has purchased cyber insurance for losses
due to stolen credit card numbers as a result of system security breaches, but
the policy it actually purchased may contain an exclusion that takes away that
very coverage.
Cyber policies also typically exclude coverage for claims arising out of
“war” or “acts of foreign enemies.”100 Insurers may interpret these exclusions
to mean policyholders do not have coverage for the losses associated with
many cyber attacks because some of the major cyber attacks are believed to
have been launched by hostile foreign countries such as Russia, China, and
North Korea.101
II. THE CHALLENGES OF INSURING CYBER RISKS
Creating a robust market for cyber insurance where policyholders can
obtain real coverage for the cyber risks they are facing at actuarially sound
and fair prices has several obstacles to overcome. Some of the primary ones
have been touched upon, but they will be highlighted and discussed in more
detail in this part.

99. See, e.g., P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM,
2016 WL 3055111, at *1, *8 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016) (applying contractual liability exclusion in
cyber policy to eliminate coverage for policyholder’s losses associated with reimbursing credit card
processing company for credit card costs and fees associated with a security breach).
100. See, e.g., The Hartford CyberChoice 2.0, supra note 75, at § IV(A)(8),
https://safeguardme.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/PDF3.pdf. (excluding coverage for losses in
any way related to “war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities or warlike operations (whether
war is declared or not) . . . .”); Reed, supra note 4, at 192 (“[T]he policies often include exclusions
for claims based upon or arising out of war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, etc.”).
101. See Reed, supra note 4, at 192; 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION,
supra note 14, at § 29.01[2][a][ii]; WOLFF, supra note 15, at 121. The strength of insurers’
argument regarding the applicability of war exclusions is questionable, however, because it often is
unclear who precisely launched the cyber attacks and the attacks may be made for reasons other
than as acts of war. Id. Indeed, such exclusions have been narrowly interpreted in other contexts
to apply only to actions by “sovereign” nations. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1015 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that war exclusions did not apply where
a Pan American Airlines plane was hijacked and destroyed because the actors were “a radical
political group, rather than a sovereign government”); Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty
Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143, 1158 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that the costs to move the production of a
movie due to rocket fire by Hamas into Jerusalem were not excluded by war exclusions because
“Hamas did not constitute a de facto or de jure sovereign during the July 2014 conflict between
Hamas and Israel”).
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A. Correlated Catastrophic Risks
One of the principal challenges to insuring cyber risks is that cyber risks
can be correlated.102 Correlated risks are perils that cause numerous losses
to the pool of insureds at approximately the same time.103 Because the losses
to many policyholders occur at approximately the same time, correlated risks
can cause catastrophic losses for insurers. Consequently, for most types of
correlated risks, such as the natural catastrophes of floods and earthquakes,
private insurers generally refuse to insure them.104 Private insurers avoid
insuring correlated risks because of insurers’ alleged inability to accurately
predict when and where losses associated with correlated risks will occur,
which in turn makes it difficult to establish actuarially sound premiums and
spread the risk of loss across a large enough pool of insureds with diverse
risk profiles.105
If an insurance company is not well-capitalized and is exposed to
correlated risks, then the insurer may become insolvent in the event the risk
is realized. For example, after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992,
numerous insurers became insolvent.106 In 2018, a California insurer
similarly became insolvent after a wildfire known as the “Camp Fire”
destroyed ninety percent of the homes in Paradise, California.107
Consequently, because most private insurers generally refuse to insure
correlated risks, the losses associated with correlated risks are often
uninsured or underinsured.108
With respect to cyber risks, the insurance industry understandably is
wary of providing large amounts of insurance for them because some cyber
102. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 14 (“Prior work on cyber-insurance includes significant
theoretical modeling of the cyber-insurance industry and the challenges it presents, such as
correlated losses.”); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1538 (“[M]any risks relating to cybersecurity are
correlated.”).
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. See Cummins, supra note 19, at 342–43; Bruggeman et al., supra note 19, at 187.
105. See Bruggeman et al., supra note 19, at 187.
106. See LYNNE MCCHRISTIAN, HURRICANE ANDREW AND INSURANCE: THE ENDURING
IMPACT
OF
AN
HISTORIC
STORM
5
(Aug.
2012),
https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/paper_HurricaneAndrew_final.pdf; Cassandra R. Cole et al.,
The Use of Post-Loss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 265, 266 (2011).
107. See Dale Kasler & Michael Finch II, Insurer Goes Bust From Camp Fire With Millions in
Claims Unpaid. How Will It Affect Paradise Homeowners?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/fires/article222563185.html; Kristin Lam, Northern
California Town of Paradise Lost 90% of its Population After Camp Fire, Data Shows, USA TODAY
(July 14, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/11/paradise-californiapopulation-camp-fire-california-wildfire-fund/1710525001/.
108. See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/factstatistic/facts-statistics-us-catastrophes (noting that in 2018, there were approximately $33 billion
in uninsured losses caused by natural catastrophes).
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risks may result in correlated losses.109 For example, in a matter of days,
NotPetya caused $10 billion in losses worldwide, and WannaCry impacted
300,000 computers in 150 different countries.110 To avoid being bankrupted
by massive, correlated cyber losses, insurers currently limit the amount of
cyber insurance they are willing to sell to individual policyholders.111
Insurers also purchase reinsurance to transfer some of their losses to other
insurers.112 As discussed further in Section II.D, insurers’ decisions to
provide only limited cyber coverage due to correlated risk concerns,
however, leave policyholders uninsured or underinsured for many cyber
risks.
B. Too Little Risk and Loss Data
Another significant challenge facing cyber insurers is the fact that cyber
insurance has only been around for a little more than two decades, so robust

109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also WOLFF, supra note 15, at 5 (“But
cyberattacks like NotPetya were not restricted to any single location or industry sector. For insurers,
that meant potentially facing a massive number of claims simultaneously with no obvious path to
diversifying their customer base in a way that would reliably prevent correlated losses.”); LLOYD’S,
CLOUD DOWN: IMPACTS ON THE US ECONOMY 5 (2018) (“[R]eliance on a relatively small number
of [cloud services] companies has resulted in systemic risk for businesses using their services. In
the event of sustained downtime of a top cloud service provider, simultaneous damage for all its
clients and dependents could lead to catastrophic financial losses.”).
110. See supra notes 8–9.
111. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 15, at 5 (“[T]o avoid correlated losses . . . insurers deliberately
diversif[y] their customers to be certain they [are] not all concentrated in any one place . . . .”);
Camillo, supra note 39, at 62 (“Due to concerns over aggregation, many insurers are currently
reluctant to offer substantial limits for cyber terrorism, or cyberattack[s] . . . .”).
112. Reinsurance is a worldwide business wherein global reinsurers insure all, or portions, of
another insurer’s portfolio of business. See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.01[a], [b] (19th ed. 2019) (generally
discussing reinsurance). Most reinsurance is sold by European and Bermuda companies. See, e.g.,
FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE
MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED
STATES
5
(2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-andnotices/Documents/FIO%20-%20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf (“[I]n 2013 approximately $46
billion in total (P/C) reinsurance premiums were ceded by U.S.-based insurers to unaffiliated
reinsurers; of this amount, approximately $28.4 billion of premiums were ceded to non-U.S.
reinsurers and approximately $17.6 billion of premiums were ceded to U.S. professional
reinsurers.”); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1615 (2014) (“[R]einsurance is an international business––the largest
companies are located in Europe and Bermuda . . . .”). In fact, reinsurance paid 60% of the insured
losses related to the September 11th terrorist attacks, 65% of the insured losses resulting from
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and 40% of the insured Hurricane Sandy losses. See FED.
INS. OFF., supra, at 15.

124

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:103

claims databases regarding cyber losses do not yet exist.113 Without accurate
claims data, actuarially accurate premium pricing is not possible.114
In addition, because cyber insurance is sold by hundreds of insurers with
numerous different policy forms, the claims information of one insurer may
not be particularly useful to another insurer using a different policy form.115
Even if it would be useful, however, insurers generally do not share their own
claims data because they view it as proprietary and confidential
information.116
Another impediment to creating robust cyber risk databases is that, aside
from system breaches where consumers’ private information is
compromised, victimized companies historically have not been required to
report or disclose most cyber breaches.117 If system hacks are not reported
or disclosed, then insurers can only guess as to how many are actually
occurring.
Unlike other risks, cyber risks are also constantly changing because
cyber criminals are continually creating new means and ways of attacking or
hacking into computer systems.118 This, in turn, means cyber insurers also
must predict how many, and how severe, future cyber losses will be from
previously unknown types of cyber attacks. Collectively, these uncertainties
regarding the frequency and scope of future cyber losses make it extremely
difficult to accurately price premiums for cyber insurance.
C. Untested Policy Language
Cyber insurers also must price cyber policies with somewhat of an
information void regarding how courts will interpret the policy language
contained in cyber policies.119 Although some of the policy language has
been cut and pasted from other lines of insurance and courts have interpreted
that language in other contexts, cyber policies are new enough, and have
varying policy language, such that cyber policy language generally has not

113. See supra notes 21–22, 84 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 24, 28–29 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also WOLFF, supra note 15, at 47, 167
(explaining that under state breach notification laws, only thefts of personal identifying information
must be reported, while “[a]ll other cybersecurity incidents, from online extortion to theft of
intellectual property and denial-of-service attacks, could still go unreported”).
118. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 15, at 230–31 (“[N]either carriers nor policy-holders are
necessarily able to anticipate the kinds of cyber risks that will emerge even one or two years into
the future.”); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 1538 (“[T]here is dramatic uncertainty as to the actual risk
exposure associated with cyber-incidents.”).
119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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been tested in the courts.120 Therefore, much of the policy language does not
have court-established meanings.121 The lack of interpretation by courts of
the policy language and the coverage provided under cyber policies means
that neither insurers nor policyholders can be confident regarding what
coverage cyber policies actually provide. This information void is another
factor that adds to the complexity of establishing actuarially sound premium
prices.
D. Lack of a Uniform Policy Form
For policyholders, it is currently very difficult to compare cyber
insurers, cyber policies’ coverages, and the prices of cyber policies because
cyber insurers are not selling the same product.122 There are hundreds of
insurers selling cyber policies using different policy forms that provide
different coverages and use different policy language.123
Thus, a
policyholder currently needs to be very sophisticated regarding both
insurance and cyber security, or employ sophisticated intermediaries, in order
to procure an appropriate cyber policy to cover the types of cyber risks the
policyholder’s particular business faces.124
That is not the case for other lines of insurance, such as CGL policies,
where insurers all sell the same product, so policyholders can compare
insurers based upon the price of the insurance and the claims handling
reputations of the insurers.125 Indeed, despite ever-increasing cyber risks, one
of the reasons only one-third of businesses currently purchase cyber
insurance is because many businesses lack knowledge regarding the cyber
risks they face and the various cyber coverages being sold that is necessary
to make an intelligent purchase of cyber insurance.126 Yet, most
policyholders do not employ the sophisticated cyber risk and insurance
120. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Some scholars have argued that insurers reuse
policy language year after year once the language has been interpreted by courts because the courtestablished meaning of the language aids in the actuarial process. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006)
(arguing that the predictability in the interpretation of policy language by courts incentivizes ISO
not to change policy language).
121. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 24, 28–29 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 24, 28–29 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 14, at
§ 29.01[4] (“Given the complexity of assessing the potential losses and determining how best to
cover those risks, it may be helpful [for policyholders] to engage insurance brokers, consultants or
outside attorneys before purchasing [cyber] insurance.”); Reed, supra note 4, at 171 (“[T]he
research and analysis required by an individual potential insured are currently substantial.”).
125. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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intermediaries needed to purchase cyber insurance as it currently is being
offered.127 Consequently, two-thirds of American businesses are largely
uninsured with respect to cyber risks.128
E. Too Little Actual Coverage
Another problem with the usefulness of cyber insurance from the
policyholders’ perspective is that the policies only cover specifically listed
types of cyber risks and losses instead of all types of cyber risks and losses,
and the policy language granting coverage is narrowly written with numerous
exclusions.129 This means a lot of policyholders’ cyber risks and losses are
not covered, which leaves policyholders uninsured for those risks.130 Thus,
under current cyber policies, policyholders, not insurers, generally bear the
risk of losses from new forms of cyber attacks. Because cyber attacks are
constantly evolving, the cyber insurance currently being sold may not be a
very valuable asset for many policyholders if it leaves policyholders
uninsured for new forms of cyber attack. Such insurance also is not serving
the purpose for which businesses buy cyber insurance—to transfer the risk of
expensive, or even catastrophic, cyber losses from policyholders to
insurers.131
Even for cyber risks that are covered, the coverage provided is limited
because cyber policies typically have low policy limits and high
deductibles.132 According to some reports, insurers generally are unwilling
to sell more than $10 million to $25 million in limits of coverage to a single
policyholder.133 The most cyber insurance that currently can be purchased,
even when it is purchased from numerous insurers in various amounts,
collectively only totals approximately $300 million.134
The potential losses from a cyber attack for some companies, however,
far exceed the amount of available cyber insurance. For example, the
NotPetya malware attack knocked out 30,000 computers and 7,500 servers at

127. See supra note 83.
128. See supra note 83.
129. See supra notes 65–66, 90–93, 98, 100 and accompanying text; see also WOLFF, supra note
15, at 156 (“[A]s exclusions of cyber risk grew broader over time . . . the definitions of covered
cyber risks in stand-alone policies grew narrower and more specific.”).
130. WOLFF, supra note 15, at 156. Target, for example, reportedly was only able to purchase
$100 million in coverage despite trying to purchase more than that before its well-publicized cyber
attack which cost Target more than $200 million. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 170; Reuters, supra
note 12.
131. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
133. See Romanosky et al., supra note 22, at 2.
134. See id.
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Merck & Co. and allegedly cost the pharmaceutical company $1.3 billion.135
Even if Merck had $300 million in coverage, it still would have had a $1
billion uninsured loss, which is a staggering amount.
Other policyholders think they are covered for cyber losses under the
policies they purchased, but when they present claims, they are surprised to
learn that the cyber policies they purchased do not actually cover the cyber
losses at issue due to exclusions in the policies. For example, the restaurant
chain P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. paid an annual premium of $134,052
for a cyber policy that specifically covered losses due to “cyber attacks” into
the “insured’s system.”136 P.F. Chang’s was hacked and 60,000 credit card
numbers of its customers subsequently were posted on the Internet.137
MasterCard assessed P.F. Chang’s credit card processing company, among
other costs, a charge of $1,716,798.85 to reimburse MasterCard for the
fraudulent credit card charges that resulted from the hack.138 In turn, P.F.
Chang’s credit card processing company charged P.F. Chang’s for that
amount pursuant to its credit card processing agreement, under which P.F.
Chang’s agreed to reimburse the company for any assessments that credit
card companies imposed as a result of P.F. Chang’s acts or omissions.139
P.F. Chang’s tendered the claim to its cyber insurer, which, in turn,
denied coverage based on a contractual liability exclusion similar to the one
discussed in Section I.B.140 The court agreed with the cyber insurer that the
exclusion applied.141 Thus, a policyholder that processed a lot of credit card
transactions as part of its business and purchased cyber insurance to cover
cyber attacks into its system did not actually have coverage for cyber attacks
into its system for one of the primary risks it faced (i.e., theft of customers’
credit card numbers) because the policyholder had a contractual obligation to
reimburse another party that was injured by the hack. So, just how effective
was the cyber risk transfer that P.F. Chang’s purchased for $134,052?
In short, for cyber insurance to be a meaningful source of risk transfer
for some businesses, cyber insurance will need to provide much more robust
coverage than it currently does. Cyber insurance also needs to be available

135. See, e.g., Riley Griffin, Katherine Chiglinsky & David Voreacos, Was It an Act of War?
That’s Merck Cyber Attack’s $1.3 Billion Insurance Question., INS. J. (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/12/03/550039.htm.
136. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM, 2016 WL
3055111, at *1, 6 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016).
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *7; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at *8.
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with much higher limits of coverage because the potential losses facing some
companies far exceed the limits currently available for purchase.
III. POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO INSURING CYBER RISKS
Moving forward, how should the creation and sale of cyber insurance
policies change, if at all, to address the problems discussed in Part II? This
Part addresses that question and provides potential answers to it.
A. Maintain the Status Quo—Let the Market Solve the Problems
One option is to stay the course and let the process that has been
unfolding over the past two decades continue to unfold. The principal
argument in support of the status quo is that markets are more efficient than
the government at solving problems, so the market should be allowed to
address the problems in the cyber insurance market.142
Under this approach, market forces would be left alone to work out the
most efficient solution to the problems facing the cyber insurance market.
That essentially has been the government’s position thus far.143 The
government has been content to let the cyber insurance market cover
policyholders’ cyber losses to the extent insurers are willing to do so with
little regulation.144 According to Professor Wolff, “governments across the
world appeared to be convinced that insurers could figure out how to build
better risk models and strengthen cybersecurity practices in industry better
than policy-makers.”145
Although there are some statutes, such as HIPPA and the various state
notification laws, that require hacked policyholders to advise their customers
142. See generally Alan Kirman, Economic Theory and the Crisis, VOXEU (Nov. 14, 2009),
https://voxeu.org/article/economic-theory-and-crisis (“[T]he efficient markets hypothesis . . . has
ruled the roost for some years in finance. Its originator was, by common accord, Louis Bachelier,
who developed the notion of Brownian motion at the turn of the twentieth century.”); Baruti Kafele,
Can The Free Market Solve Society’s Problems? Hell Yes!, BEING LIBERTARIAN, (Dec. 18, 2016),
https://beinglibertarian.com/can-free-market-solve-societys-problems-hell-yes/
(“[H]istory
continually proves that when people autonomously and organically solve problems in the free
market, then progress is unquestionable. Alternatively, government intervention and intrusion into
the private affairs of citizens often causes more confusion, stagnation, and inefficiency in the long
term . . . .”); David Brooks, Opinion, I Was Once a Socialist. Then I Saw How It Worked., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2019, at A31 (“Socialist planned economies . . . interfere with price and other market
signals in a million ways. They suppress or eliminate profit motives that drive people to learn and
improve.”).
143. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 13 (“Subscribing to the view that the private sector knows
best how to handle these risks, the federal government remained relatively hands-off . . . .”).
144. See id. at 162 (“[T]he U.S. government seemed hesitant to take any tangible steps toward
establishing any formal data repository or collection system.”).
145. Id., supra note 15, at 196.
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when their customers’ personal information has been compromised, to date,
the government has not developed any mandatory cyber security
requirements or best practices.146 Indeed, “there is no authoritative source
for cyber risk assessment.”147
Consequently, insurers, to some extent, have become the de facto
regulators of cyber security practices through the coverages they provide and
the cyber risk management counseling services they sell to their
policyholders for a separate fee.148 Thus far, however, insurers filling the
role of cybersecurity regulators have not translated into lower premium rates
for policyholders or more coverage for policyholders. As a result, the
primary beneficiaries of the current approach appear to be insurers and the
cyber security service providers with whom they have partnered.149
As for the actual coverage provided by cyber policies and the limits of
coverage sold, insurers can defend the status quo by noting that insurers
historically have avoided insuring correlated risks that could result in
catastrophically large losses for insurers which could jeopardize their
financial solvency.150 As discussed in Section II.A, correlated risks are
situations where numerous people have essentially the same risk of the same
type of loss occurring at approximately the same time.151 Correlated risk
concerns are greatest when an insurer sells insurance to a limited pool of
insureds that face the same risks at the same time.152 For example, people
who live in the same neighborhood generally face similar risks of natural
catastrophes.153 Insurers generally attempt to avoid insuring correlated risks
due to actuarial and capitalization concerns.154
146. See Hurwitz supra note 15, at 1516 (“In the United States there is no general law of data
security.”); see also WOLFF, supra note 15, at 158 (“[T]here is relatively little consensus about the
most effective baseline security practices and risk management techniques for organizations to
reduce their risk exposure . . . .”).
147. WOLFF, supra note 15, at 187 (quoting Romanosky et al., supra note 22).
148. WOLFF, supra note 15, at 183 (“I wouldn’t say that we have data to suggest that the
money . . . our customers have spent on prevention partners has improved the security
performance . . . .”) (quoting the Chief Underwriting Officer of XL Catlin); Talesh, supra note 15,
at 429 (“Insurance companies either have in-house departments or contract with third-party
organizations that offer a series of services aimed at preventing data breaches and violations of
privacy laws from ever occurring.”).
149. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 180 (“Insurers . . . did not have sufficient confidence in [their
cyber risk management] partners to link their pricing schemes to those companies’ services or
assessments, and policy-holders therefore received no clear value from engaging with those
partners.”).
150. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 105–107 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Cummins, supra note 19, at 342–43.
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Insurers limiting the amount of coverage they are willing to underwrite
and limiting the actual coverage provided under their policies by drafting
cyber policies as named peril policies, as opposed to all-risk policies, and
then adding dozens of exclusions could be viewed as a prudent way of
protecting against catastrophic losses in the event of a correlated cyber loss
event. If cyber risks are correlated risks, then policyholders should be
grateful there is a private cyber insurance market at all because private
insurance generally is not available for other types of correlated risks, such
as flooding and earthquakes.155
With that said, just because a cyber threat can impact numerous entities
at the same time does not mean that a large percentage of an individual
insurer’s policyholders will suffer correlated losses. This is because different
industries face different types of cyber risks. For example, P.F. Chang’s and
Merck both face cyber risks, but they are not the same cyber risks. P.F.
Chang’s is a retail restaurateur that processes thousands of credit cards on a
daily basis, while Merck is a pharmaceutical company that does not process
thousands of credit card purchases daily. Consequently, their risks from a
cyber attack are not correlated. Similarly, although malware, such as
WannaCry, could impact thousands of computers around the world, that does
not mean that all the owners of the computers impacted would be insured by
the same insurer. Accordingly, to reduce the correlation of cyber losses,
insurers need to sell cyber policies to policyholders in diverse industries to
ensure their insureds are not all vulnerable to the same cyber risks.
Further, reinsurance and catastrophe bonds are two additional ways that
insurers can mitigate and spread correlated risks of loss. Reinsurance is a
worldwide business wherein global reinsurers insure all of, or portions of,
another insurer’s portfolio of business.156 For example, as a result of insurers’
purchase of reinsurance, reinsurers paid 60% of the insured losses related to
the September 11th terrorist attacks, 65% of the insured Hurricane Katrina
losses, and 40% of the insured Hurricane Sandy losses.157
By purchasing reinsurance, cyber insurers can spread the risk of
catastrophic cyber events to other insurers throughout the world. Thus,
through reinsurance, cyber losses effectively become less correlated with
respect to the losses any individual insurer faces because the losses are
insured by multiple insurers worldwide and spread across worldwide pools
of insureds with diverse risk profiles.

155. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 112, at § 15.01[a], [b]; Christopher C. French,
The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1109 (2015).
157. See FED. INS. OFF., supra note 112, at 15.
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Catastrophe bonds are bonds that are issued for specific types of
catastrophes, such as natural catastrophes, and they are sold to institutional
investors.158 Catastrophe bonds emerged in the 1990s following Hurricane
Andrew in Florida and the Northridge Earthquake in California as a new way
to diversify insurers’ risks with respect to catastrophic events.159 Typically,
institutional investors receive interest payments on the bonds and the return
of their principal at the end of the bond term unless the specified catastrophe
occurs, in which case the investors forfeit their rights to the return of the
principal and any additional interest payments.160 The retained money is then
available to pay the insured losses, which means the true risk of loss is
transferred from the insurer to the institutional bondholders. As of August
2020, $41.5 billion in catastrophe bonds were outstanding.161
Cyber insurers could use catastrophe bonds to reduce their risks of
suffering correlated, catastrophic cyber attack losses. For example, a
catastrophe bond could be issued to cover any named malware event that
impacted an established number of computer systems (e.g., 10,000) or a
specified dollar amount of loss (e.g., $1,000,000). By doing so, the insurer
effectively could create a stop-loss point that triggers the forfeiture of the
institutional investors’ catastrophe bonds, thereby creating a pool of capital
to pay the losses.
In fact, Aon plc, a global insurance broker, and Hudson Structured
Capital Management Limited, a Bermuda-based reinsurer, recently
introduced a cyber risk catastrophe bond product in November 2020.162 This
development further buttresses the argument that cyber risks can be insured
in large amounts. It also weakens the argument in favor of the status quo to
the extent the argument is based upon the premise that cyber risks are
uninsurable in high amounts due to correlated risk concerns.
As discussed in Sections II.C, II.D, and II.E, maintaining the status quo
is also problematic from policyholders’ perspectives.163 Cyber insurance
currently is very expensive for the amount of coverage being provided.164
158. See Facts + Statistics: Catastrophe Bonds and Other Insurance-Linked Securities, INS.
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-catastrophe-bonds (last visited Oct. 1,
2021) [hereinafter Catastrophe Bonds].
159. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-941, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: THE
ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 15–16 (2002),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-02-941.pdf.
160. See Scales, supra note 19, at 46.
161. See Catastrophe Bonds, supra note 158.
162. See Aon Secures $70 Million Alternative Capital Capacity Led by HSCM to Transfer
Systemic Cyber Risk, AON (Nov. 19, 2020), https://aon.mediaroom.com/newsreleases?item=138033.
163. See supra Sections II.C–E.
164. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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There also are dozens of different cyber policy forms being sold that are so
dense that one needs to retain experts in both cyber security and insurance to
even attempt to make an educated purchase.165 The cyber policies currently
being sold also provide inadequate actual insurance coverage because the
coverage grants are narrowly written and then subject to a prolix of
exclusions.166
The insurance industry has had more than twenty years to consolidate
the policy forms being sold, to make the policies understandable and
affordable, and to provide meaningful coverage. It has not done so.
Consequently, although markets theoretically should be efficient ways to
solve problems, sometimes they fail to do so.167 After twenty years of trying,
the cyber insurance market appears to be a market that is incapable of solving
its problems on its own. Indeed, insurers have even acknowledged the cyber
insurance market cannot solve the problems it is facing without legislative or
regulatory intervention.168 The potential forms of that intervention will be
discussed in the next four Sections of the Article.
B. Cover Cyber Risks Under Commercial General Liability and AllRisk Property Policies
Instead of maintaining the status quo, one potential solution to some of
the cyber insurance market’s current problems is for all-risk property and
CGL policies to cover cyber losses, just as they do for most physical injuries
and losses.169 Professors Jeff Stempel and Erik Knutsen are champions of
this approach. They refer to it as the “techno-neutral” solution.170 Under this
approach, cyber risks are not considered materially different from other types
of risks insured by CGL policies and property policies.171 For example, using
cyber attacks to steal credit card numbers is just a new form of theft. The
fact that the physical credit cards have not been stolen is not important. And
property insurance has long covered theft.172 Similarly, since the 1940s, CGL

165. See supra notes 24, 29 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 90–93, 97–98, 100 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
168. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 238 (“The idea that cybersecurity can be handled solely, or
even primarily, through a market-driven approach led by insurers is a flawed one—something that
insurers themselves, to their credit, have been pointing out to policy-makers for years.”).
169. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 647 (“The long-term solution is for insurers to
simply fold cyber-loss coverage into traditional coverage products and not differentiate a loss based
on its particular or peculiar property characteristics.”).
170. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 673–74.
171. See id. at 655 (“Cyber losses due to crime or fraud are also no different in end result than
losses due to crime or fraud in the physical world.”).
172. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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policies have covered policyholders’ liabilities to third parties for injuries
caused by policyholders’ negligence.173
Much of business and personal life today is conducted on computers and
the Internet. People now download or stream movies and music instead of
buying DVDs and CDs. People now pay bills online instead of using checks
or cash and buy countless items online from Amazon.com that are directly
delivered to their homes instead of going to stores. Consequently, the risk of
physical injuries, such as the physical theft of a credit card, is likely far lower
today than the risk of a cyber theft of a credit card number. That, in turn,
means the need for insurance to cover many types of physical injuries and
losses today is also likely lower than it was twenty years ago because many
assets now reside in cyber space, not physical space.
When viewed in this light, insurers’ attempts to exclude coverage for
cyber losses under traditional property and liability policies could be viewed
as profiteering. Insurers are providing less coverage under traditional
policies by excluding coverage for cyber losses, which in the past were
physical losses, so people need less traditional insurance today than they did
in the past. Simultaneously, however, if consumers want coverage for the
types of risks they actually face with greater probability today (i.e., cyber
risks), then they are forced to purchase a standalone cyber policy at a high
price in exchange for limited coverage.
One way to rectify this situation would be for traditional policies to
simply cover cyber risks in the same way they cover the analogous risks of
physical losses or injuries. Traditional insurance historically has covered
many types of intangible and invisible injuries, so including cyber risks in
the coverage would simply be another category of such injuries. For
example, “[d]amages from pollution or gas, mold, odors, and asbestos are all
losses covered by typical insurance policies.”174 Cyber risks would just be
one more type of intangible losses that would be covered. As evidenced by
the addition of the electronic data loss exclusion and other cyber risk
exclusions to traditional insurance policies that are discussed in Section I.A,
insurers obviously do not want to do that. Thus, if this approach were
adopted, then legislatures or insurance regulators would need to force
insurers to include coverage for cyber risks in traditional policies.

173. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and
Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 349, 355–58 (2006) (discussing the
creation of CGL policies in the 1940s); ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 453
(reproducing ISO’s CGL policy form under which the policy covers losses for bodily injuries,
property damage, and personal injuries due to the policyholder’s negligence).
174. Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 2, at 658 (citing Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in
Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55, 66–67 (2001)).
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Insurance is already a heavily regulated industry because of, among
other reasons, insurers’ significant information advantage over consumers,
the large disparity in power between insurers and consumers, the
monopolization by insurers of the drafting of insurance policy language, and
insurers’ sale of most types of policies on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.175
Consequently, to protect policyholders, state insurance regulators are
empowered to review and approve the policy forms used by insurers,
including the language used in the policies and the coverages provided.176 In
doing so, regulators have the power to reject terms that are “unfair,”
“ambiguous,” “unreasonable,” and/or “contrary to public policy.”177
Insurance regulators could find that the exclusion of coverage for cyber risks
under traditional policies, and the sale of cyber policies as currently drafted,
is unfair, ambiguous, and/or unreasonable.
In addition, as discussed in Part II, cyber policies provide only limited
coverage in exchange for high premiums, and policyholders need to employ
expert insurance intermediaries and cyber security experts in order to attempt
to understand what types of claims are actually covered by cyber policies. It
is, however, within insurance regulators’ power to force insurers to provide
cyber coverage differently.
Under the techno-neutral approach, cyber risk coverage would revert to
being included under CGL and all-risk property policies. As discussed in the
Introduction, CGL policies and all-risk property policies cover all risks of
loss unless a type of loss is specifically excluded.178 Such policies are
intended to be the broadest types of liability and property insurance sold.179
One of the greatest attributes of all-risk insurance is that a purchaser does not
need to be an insurance expert to understand the basic coverage being
purchased—all risks are covered except for risks specifically excluded.
Granted, the coverage provided by typical CGL policies and all-risk property
policies has been whittled down some over the years, as reflected by the fact

175. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Dual Regulation of Insurance, 64 VILL. L. REV. 25, 33–
35 (2019); NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 2 (2011),
https://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EKTT88K] (“Insurance is more heavily regulated than other types of business because of the complexity
of the insurance contracts, the lack of sufficient information for insurance consumers to adequately
shop for prices and adequacy of coverage and because insurance contracts are generally contracts
of adhesion.”).
176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27–14–9 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 33–24–10 (2016); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44–7513 (2016).
177. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27–14–9 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 33–24–10 (2016); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44–7513 (2016).
178. See supra notes 17 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., French, supra note 156, at 1107.
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that such policies currently contain numerous exclusions.180 But, the
coverage such policies offer is still far more comprehensive and
comprehensible than cyber policies, and CGL and all-risk property policies
are sold using uniform, standardized policy forms. So, a purchaser does not
need to attempt to compare and understand dozens of different policy forms
before purchase, as it does for cyber insurance, in order to buy the right policy
for its business.
Similarly, all-risk policies also have the advantage of providing
coverage to businesses that do not have a sophisticated appreciation of the
types of risks they are facing because the policies cover all risks. Thus,
purchasers of all-risk insurance can let the experts at risk assessment—
insurers—figure out what the policyholder’s risks are and price the insurance
accordingly. In short, all-risk policies shift the burden of risk assessment
from policyholders to the parties most qualified to analyze the risks.
Because cyber risks essentially are just the twenty-first century
manifestation of many of the traditional risks of loss or injury covered by
CGL and property insurance, those lines of insurance could easily be updated
to include coverage for cyber risks. It would be as simple as deleting a few
exclusions from the policies and clarifying that the definition of “property
damage” includes lost electronic data. Loss of use of property is already
covered by such policies,181 so a clarification that “property damage”
includes lost electronic data and the inability to use a covered computer
system would be the primary changes needed to accomplish this result.
Insurers, of course, likely would argue that cyber risks are different than
traditional risks of physical loss or injury, which is why they exclude
coverage for them under traditional lines of insurance.182 They also would
likely argue that they would not be able to charge actuarially sound premium
rates due to the lack of cyber risk data, and that cyber risks are correlated
risks such that they cannot be insured on an all-risk basis.183
There are, of course, rejoinders to such arguments. One rejoinder is that
these obstacles apparently are surmountable when insurers sell cyber
insurance as standalone policies with profit margins of sixty-five percent, so
they also should be surmountable if cyber coverage were included in CGL
and all-risk property policies. A second rejoinder is that insurers could and
should make cyber risk losses less correlated by selling policies across
diverse industries to diversify their insured pools and by using reinsurance
180. Id. at 1096–114 (discussing the erosion of coverage under all-risk policies over time).
181. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 453 (reproducing the definition of
“property damage” in ISO’s CGL policy form).
182. See supra Section I.A.
183. See supra Section II.A.
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and catastrophe bonds to further spread the risks. A third rejoinder is that
insurers, either cooperatively or through regulatory mandate, could share
information regarding cyber risks and loss data to reduce the uncertainty
regarding likely loss rates. By doing so, they could be more confident that
the premium rates needed to cover such losses are actuarially sound.
C. Create Uniform Standalone All Cyber Risk Liability and Property
Policies
Another option for addressing the current problems with cyber
insurance would be for cyber insurance to be offered under uniform all cyber
risk standalone policies that cover only cyber risks. Under this approach,
there would be a uniform standalone all cyber risk liability policy, and a
uniform standalone all cyber risk property policy. The policies would only
cover cyber risks, but they would cover all cyber risks.
Offering separate liability and property policies would make cyber
insurance more consistent with most other lines of insurance that do not
combine third-party liability coverage with first-party property coverage in a
single policy.184 Although the techno-neutral approach of folding cyber risks
back into the coverage provided by traditional lines of insurance makes some
sense, cyber risks arguably are different than most traditional physical risks.
This is because cyber risks are quickly evolving, and the reach of cyber
criminals is worldwide. Risk modeling cyber risks in the absence of
comprehensive claims and risk data creates a different risk/reward
calculation for insurers, so it seems fair to allow insurers to treat cyber risks
differently than traditional risks for which there are established claims
databases. That does not mean, however, that insurers should be given carte
blanche to do whatever they want when it comes to cyber insurance.
Offering separate all cyber risk liability and property policies would also
allow policyholders to purchase coverage for just the risks with which they
are concerned. For example, retail stores, such as Walmart, may be very
concerned about losing personal customer information, such as credit card
numbers, and the associated ensuing liabilities. Other companies, such as
Pfizer, may be more concerned about having valuable intellectual property,
such as the formulas for new vaccines, stolen by a hacker. Of course, if there
were a market preference by policyholders for cyber policies to combine
184. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 183 (“First-party insurance protects
the insured against a loss that she . . . suffers herself; it is ‘victim’s insurance.’ Fire, property, life,
health, and disability insurance fall into this category. In contrast, third-party insurance protects the
insured against legal liability to a third-party resulting from the insured’s actions.”). Auto insurance
and homeowners’ insurance are the two most notable exceptions to the general rule that policies
either provide first-party or third-party coverage.
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first-party and third-party coverages in a single policy, as many cyber policies
currently do, then it could continue to be done in the future as well.
The key under this approach, however, is to switch cyber insurance from
named peril coverage to all-risk coverage and use uniform policy forms.
Doing so would make the policies much easier to understand and would allow
less sophisticated businesses to make informed purchases without the need
to retain insurance expert intermediaries and cyber security experts. Offering
cyber insurance as all-risk coverage also would make the coverage broader.
As things stand now, the coverage provided under cyber policies is narrowly
written and backstopped with a litany of exclusions that arguably take away
much of the limited coverage provided in certain situations.185 By selling
cyber insurance as named peril insurance, where only specific types of cyber
risks are listed and covered, the policyholder is left uninsured for any risk not
specifically listed, including all unknown types of cyber risks.186
Ideally, the cyber risk policy forms sold by insurers also would be
standardized and uniform such that all insurers selling cyber insurance would
be using the same policy forms. This would allow policyholders to make
apples-to-apples comparisons among insurers based upon premium prices
and the quality of claims handling services.
Moving to all-risk coverage would provide the most meaningful
improvement, however, if insurers did not then load up the policies with a
prolix of exclusions. Yet, even if insurers were to attempt to remove a
significant amount of the all-risk coverage provided through exclusions, the
rules of insurance policy interpretation—insurers have the burden of proving
the applicability of exclusions, any ambiguities in the policy language are
construed against insurers, and exclusions should be interpreted in a way that
prevents them from making the coverage grant illusory187—collectively

185. See supra Section II.E.
186. See WOLFF, supra note 15, at 188 (“[It is] difficult to take the named-peril approach to
cyber underwriting that carriers have adopted without leaving significant holes in customers’
coverage . . . .”).
187. See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) (ruling
that insurer has the burden to prove the applicability of an exclusion as an affirmative defense);
Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its own
contracts, it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the
insured, must suffer.”) (quoting Fowler v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 438 P.2d 46, 48 (Kan. 1968));
Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 P.3d 668, 672 (Nev. 2011) (“While clauses providing
coverage are interpreted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible coverage to the insured, clauses
excluding coverage are interpreted narrowly against the insurer.”) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v.
Reno’s Exec. Air, Inc., 682 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Nev. 1984)); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 344 Md. 515,
525, 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (1997) (“If the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision, the
provisions are completely contradictory. That is the grossest form of ambiguity . . . .”).
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would still make it much easier for policyholders to obtain coverage for cyber
losses than under the current cyber policies.
D. Use the Federal Government as an Excess Insurer or Reinsurer of
Cyber Risks
Another option for addressing many of the current problems in the cyber
insurance market would be for the federal government to act as an excess
insurer or reinsurer for private insurers where losses exceed a certain stated
amount for any individual insurer. One advantage of this approach is that it
does not simply shift cyber insurance from a market-based approach to a
government monopoly approach because it keeps private insurers as
participants in the cyber insurance market and encourages competition.
Another key advantage of using the federal government as an excess
insurer or reinsurer for cyber insurance is that it would eliminate the
correlated risk problem from private cyber insurers’ perspectives. The
primary explanation insurers provide regarding why cyber risk coverage is
sold on a named peril basis with relatively low limits of coverage is their
concern that a catastrophic cyber event could result in disastrous losses for
insurers.188 Using the federal government as a reinsurer or an excess insurer
above a certain stop-loss point would cap private insurers’ losses and thus
effectively eliminate the catastrophic downside risk to insurers created by
correlated losses.
The federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (“TRIA”) could serve as
a template for the cyber insurance market.189 The terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, caused more than $45 billion in insured losses.190 As a
result, insurers began excluding coverage for terrorism risks, and in 2002, the
TRIA was enacted to address the new gap in coverage.191

188. See supra notes 15, 39, 105 and accompanying text.
189. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). Some scholars, such as Michelle
Boardman, contend that certain risks, including terrorism, are uninsurable because the risks cannot
be accurately quantified, and therefore the TRIA is a misguided attempt to make terrorism appear
to be an insurable risk. See Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism
Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 786 (2005) (“This Article argues that terrorism insurance is not
possible. The terrorism risk is a known unknown; we are aware of the risk but are still too ignorant
to calculate and redistribute the risk in an insurance pool.”). Pursuant to this theory, cyber risks also
could be considered uninsurable risks because not enough loss data or information regarding the
risks exists to actuarially price premiums for the insurance. See supra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text.
190. See FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
TERRORISM
RISK
INSURANCE
PROGRAM
3
(2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/311/2020-TRIP-Effectiveness-Report.pdf.
191. Id.
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Under the TRIA, insurers are required to offer terrorism coverage, but
the federal government serves as a stop-loss for insurers when the insurance
industry’s aggregated losses exceed $200 million, and any individual
insurer’s losses exceed 20% of the insurer’s earned premiums on lines of
insurance eligible for terrorism coverage.192 Once the TRIA is triggered,
individual insurers are only responsible for 20% of the terrorism losses.193
The TRIA also has a program cap of $100 billion.194 Once the aggregated
losses exceed $100 billion, neither the federal government nor private
insurers have any obligation to pay for such losses.195
The cyber insurance market could be handled similarly to the terrorism
insurance market. Private insurers could continue to sell cyber insurance
with the federal government serving as an excess insurer or reinsurer above
a certain stop-loss point to ensure that there is adequate capital to cover
catastrophic cyber loss events.
Under this approach, the federal government would also have an
incentive to reduce the risk of cyber attacks and losses because it potentially
would be financially responsible if cyber losses occurred at a catastrophic
level. Consequently, the government likely would be incentivized to
mandate that insurers share cyber risk and loss data and that businesses
employ the best system security practices, so all parties would have a better
understanding of the risks and how to minimize them. The sharing of risk
and loss data also would enable insurers to price cyber policies in a more
actuarially sound way.
One problem with seeking federal involvement in the cyber insurance
market at this point, however, is that there has not been a complete market
failure for cyber insurance, which is what historically has prompted the
federal government to become involved with insurance programs. For
example, as noted, the TRIA was created in 2002 only after private insurers
added terrorism exclusions to their policies following September 11th.196
Similarly, the National Flood Insurance Program was created in 1968 after
private insurers added flood exclusions to their policies.197 The Affordable
Care Act was adopted in 2010 because there were more than forty million
people without health insurance, as insurers refused to sell health insurance
to people with pre-existing conditions or to high-risk people at affordable

192. Id. at 5–6.
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
197. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4127 (2012)).
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prices.198 Thus, Congress usually only acts with respect to insurance matters
when there is a complete market failure.
As discussed in Part II, the cyber insurance market has some significant
flaws, but there is a market for cyber insurance. Indeed, the cyber insurance
market is rapidly growing and highly profitable for insurers,199 so insurers
likely would not support federal intervention if they thought such
intervention would reduce the profitability of cyber insurance. On the other
hand, from the policyholders’ perspective, it would be very attractive to gain
access to increased cyber insurance limits at affordable prices, with the
federal government serving as an excess insurer or reinsurer for amounts
above those that private insurers are willing to sell.
One of the strongest arguments against this approach would be the
potential moral hazard problems it could create. Moral hazard theory posits
that a person will take less care to avoid losses if the losses are insured
because the financial impact of the losses will be borne by another entity.200
If the federal government were to provide stop-loss coverage to insurers, then
insurers would be protected to some extent against their own poor
underwriting practices and decisions, so insurers would have less incentive
to exercise prudent underwriting practices. Similarly, policyholders would
have little incentive to avoid or minimize cyber risks or become
knowledgeable regarding their own cyber risks or system security

198. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 349; KAREN POLLITZ, RICHARD SORIAN &
KATHY THOMAS, HOW ACCESSIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN
LESS-THAN-PERFECT HEALTH? 1–2 (2001), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/howaccessible-is-individual-health-insurance-for/ [https://perma.cc/NHH9-8GSU].
199. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“Once a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he bears less of the cost
of his conduct.”); ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 12 (5th ed., 2012) (“[T]he existence of insurance can have the perverse effect of increasing
the probability of loss. . . . This phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); Scott E. Harrington, Prices
and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS:
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 626, 631 (George Dionne & Scott Harrington eds., 1992)
(“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and characteristics of insurance coverage to produce
inefficient changes in buyers’ loss prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547
(1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the level of
insurance claims made by the insured. . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions
taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance.”); Adam F. Scales,
The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1259,
1263 (2008) (describing the term moral hazard as the phenomenon where people have a “tendency
to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the
Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 13, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’
is sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to deliberate acts like arson,
the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”).
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weaknesses if cyber insurance was widely available with unlimited policy
limits.
To some extent, the moral hazard problem that would be created by
more fully insuring cyber risk is a theoretical problem rather than a real
problem because there are proven ways to address moral hazard concerns.
With respect to insurers, they still would suffer losses up to their stop-loss
points, so they would still be incentivized to exercise good underwriting
practices even if the federal government provided stop-loss excess insurance
or reinsurance. Insurance is not profitable for insurers if they are regularly
paying more in claims than they are collecting in premiums.201 Thus, if
insurers were regularly paying the limits of their policies and triggering the
federal stop-loss protections, then it is unlikely they would be profitable
companies.
With respect to policyholders, insurers can address moral hazard
concerns by using deductibles and pricing the insurance appropriately.202
Policyholders could be incentivized to lower their risks based on the premium
prices charged and by insurers covering the costs of loss minimization efforts
taken by the policyholders in the event of cyber attacks, just as insurers
currently do under other lines of commercial insurance.203
Similarly, cyber policies could include sizeable deductibles to ensure
policyholders take steps to avoid losses.204 Deductibles align policyholders’

201. Insurers, however, also generate revenues from the “float”—the investment income they
make from premiums while waiting to pay claims. Indeed, Warren Buffet has famously
acknowledged that Berkshire-Hathaway earns most of its profits from the float, as opposed to
underwriting profits (i.e., the amount of premiums collected that exceed the amount paid for claims).
See Stempel, supra note 173, at 357, n.18; FEINMAN, supra note 21, at 16.
202. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 16, at 209 (“[I]nsurers do, in fact, commonly
share losses with insureds in various ways, including through deductibles and copayments.”); Haitao
Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort:
Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326
(2011) (discussing the use of lower premium prices for risk avoidance activities in the context of
environmental liability policies); Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1429 (2013) (“The
deductible for the driver’s first-party property damage coverage in the auto policy should control
the moral hazard of insurance in these instances.”).
203. See, e.g., John S. Clark Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767–68 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (“To be covered as reimbursable sue and labor expenses [under a commercial property
policy], those expenditures must be made for the benefit of the insurer in mitigating or preventing
a covered loss.”) (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1385
(S.D. Fla. 2001)); Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based Pricing and
Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?,
54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326 (2011) (discussing the reduction of premium prices for risk avoidance
activities in the context of environmental liability policies).
204. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 16, at 209; Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, supra
note 202, at 1429–30.
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interests with insurers’ interests in minimizing or eliminating losses because
policyholders’ losses are not completely covered in the event of a loss.205
Thus, the potential moral hazard concerns could be addressed because
policyholders who do not use the best cyber risk practices and systems would
pay higher premiums, and policyholders would absorb a portion of the losses
through deductibles if they were to have cyber loss claims.
E. Create Uniform Standalone All Cyber Risk Liability and Property
Policies and Use the Federal Government as an Excess Insurer or
Reinsurer of Cyber Risks (the “All-Risk Private-Public” Approach)
A fifth option would be to create uniform, but separate, standalone all
cyber risk liability and property policies while also using the federal
government as an excess insurer or reinsurer of cyber losses once an insurer’s
losses exceed a stop-loss amount. This hybrid approach, the “All-Risk
Private-Public” approach, would solve the biggest problems facing the cyber
insurance market. It also would capture the best aspects of the various
approaches.
By using single, uniform policy forms, the federal government would
have some certainty as to what risks it would be assuming with respect to
each and every insurer instead of the current situation where dozens of
insurers are selling cyber policies with different coverages being provided
using different policy language.206 Policyholders also would have more
certainty regarding the scope of coverage being provided by the various
insurers offering cyber insurance because the insurers would all be offering
the same coverages.207 The differences between cyber insurers would then
be revealed by the premium prices charged and the quality of claims handling
services.
Policyholders also would not need to be experts regarding insurance and
insurance policy language, or cyber risks, in order to buy cyber insurance
because, as all-risk coverage, they would only need to be concerned with the
price of the policy and the quality of the insurer selling it.208 Under this
approach, insurers would be tasked with assessing the risk presented by
policyholders when pricing the insurance. This would place the burden of
calculating the appropriate premium prices for the coverage on the parties
most qualified to assess and price the risk—the insurers. It also would
205. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 72, at 7 (“Insurers attempt to
combat . . . moral hazard with . . . deductible, coinsurance, and dollar limits of coverage in policies
so that all losses are not fully insured . . . .”).
206. See supra Section III.C.
207. See supra Section III.C.
208. See supra Section II.D.
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maintain and encourage competition between insurers in procuring
policyholder accounts.
The potential moral hazard problems for both policyholders and insurers
would, of course, still exist under this hybrid approach, as it does under the
fourth approach.209 Insurers would be protected to some extent by the federal
government from poor underwriting practices and decisions if the federal
government were to provide stop-loss excess insurance or reinsurance for
cyber risks. Policyholders also would have less incentive to ensure that their
computer systems are as secure as possible because they would be protected
by insurance. But those problems could be addressed by the ways discussed
in Section III.D.
In addition, by selling cyber insurance for first-party risks under one
policy form and third-party risks under a separate policy form, the traditional
distinction between first-party and third-party risks would be preserved. This
approach also recognizes that the risks policyholders face are not uniform—
some policyholders face substantial third-party risks, but not first-party risks,
and vice versa.210
Selling cyber insurance as standalone insurance—as opposed to being a
part of CGL or all-risk property insurance—also recognizes that cyber risks
are different in some respects than physical risks of loss, as discussed in
Section III.C. Thus, insurers that do not want to be involved in the cyber
insurance market, or insurers that do not acquire the necessary expertise to
become involved, would not be forced to provide cyber coverage by
including it in CGL policies and all-risk commercial property policies.211
CONCLUSION
Cyber risks present some of the biggest risks of the twenty-first century.
They also are some of the most challenging risks to insure. The cyber
insurance market currently is fragmented with hundreds of insurers selling
different cyber risk insurance policies that cover different types of cyber
risks.212 This means purchasers of cyber insurance must be experts or hire
experts regarding both insurance and cyber security to make a knowledgeable
purchase.213 Yet, even knowledgeable purchasers of cyber insurance can
only obtain limited coverage for cyber losses because the insurance is sold

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra Section III.D.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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on a named peril—as opposed to all-risk—basis under policies laden with
exclusions and with relatively low policy limits.214
Although there are numerous approaches to insuring cyber risks that
could address some of the current problems in the cyber insurance market,
the All-Risk Private-Public approach—where cyber risk insurance would be
provided under uniform all cyber risk liability and property policies, with the
federal government serving as a reinsurer or excess insurer above a stop-loss
amount—may be the best approach to insuring cyber risks moving
forward.215 Such an approach would address the correlated risk problem
insurers face, bring uniformity to the policy forms sold in the cyber insurance
market, and allow policyholders to obtain greater coverage for cyber risks.216

214. See supra Section III.B.
215. See supra Section III.E.
216. See supra Section III.E.

